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This study is conducted to understand the impact of political connection and tax aggressiveness to the 
firm value, since the previous studies findings are inconclusive. The data used in this study are annual 
reports from 22 mining sector companies in Indonesia for 2016-2018 period. The data collection 
method uses secondary data from the Indonesia Stock Exchange website (www.idx.com). After analyze 
by multiple linear regression technique, the results show that tax aggressiveness has an effect on firm 
value. However, political connections have no effect on company value. Therefore, it is clear that 
political connection is less crucial in determining firm value, especially for mining industries in 
Indonesia because they are already well-established and less competitive. However, tax aggressiveness 
can be considered as a factor in influencing firm value in mining industries  
Dampak Koneksi Politik dan Agresivitas Pajak Terhadap Nilai Perusahaan Sektor 




Penelitian ini dilakukan untuk memahami dampak hubungan politik dan agresivitas pajak terhadap nilai 
perusahaan, karena temuan penelitian sebelumnya tidak meyakinkan. Data yang digunakan dalam penelitian 
ini adalah laporan tahunan dari 22 perusahaan sektor pertambangan di Indonesia periode 2016-2018. 
Metode pengumpulan data menggunakan data sekunder dari web-site Bursa Efek Indonesia (www.idx.com). 
Setelah dianalisis dengan teknik regresi linier berganda, diperoleh hasil bahwa agresivitas pajak berpengaruh 
terhadap nilai perusahaan. Namun, koneksi politik tidak berpengaruh pada nilai perusahaan. Oleh karena 
itu, jelas bahwa koneksi politik kurang penting dalam menentukan nilai perusahaan, terutama bagi industri 
pertambangan di Indonesia karena mereka sudah mapan dan kurang kompetitif. Namun, agresivitas pajak 





How to Cite: Sulastri & Sari, N., D., K. (2020). The Political Connection and Tax Aggressiveness Impact to Firm Value of 
Indonesian Mining Sector 2016-2018. Ekonomi Bisnis, 26(1), 1-12  
 Correspondence Address 
 Institutional address: FEB Universitas Negeri Malang, Jl. Semarang 5 Malang 
 E-mail: sulastri.widianto@gmail.com 
ISSN  
0853-7283 (print) 2528-0503 (online) 
DOI: 10.17977/um042v26i1p1-12 
2 |Ekonomi Bisnis, Volume 26, Nomor 1 | Maret 2021 | Halaman 1-12 
 
Generally, the main purpose of investors is 
to obtain maximum capital gain. Therefore, 
investors must consider and analyze many 
things before investing. One of the 
considerable aspects is the corporate 
performance that is observable from the 
firm values (Hariati & Yeney, 2010).  
Any go-public corporations have their 
firm values determined by the supply and 
demand in the stock exchange via the stock 
price. Higher firm value leads to the higher 
stock price of the corporation. Therefore, it 
can improve the investors' trust toward the 
corporate performance and the corporate 
prospect in the future (Rahayu & Sari, 
2018). 
Knowledge about the stock price that 
reflects the firm value is inseparable from 
external factors. Genjar & Oktavia (2015) 
argue a stock price that reflects the firm 
value is influenced by many factors, such as 
the government's policy, tax, and political 
atmosphere.  
Politics has various influences on a 
corporation. For example, a political event 
that influences the supply and demand in 
the stock exchange. The correlation 
between politics and corporations creates a 
relationship between corporations and 
politics, known as a political connection. 
The political connection provides benefits 
for both parties. Politics establishes public 
policy, starting from the policy for the 
people until the business word activities. On 
the other hand, corporations, the business 
world, can support the political activities of 
a state by funding them (Wulandari, 2013). 
A corporation with political 
connections is useful to facilitate any 
government's business via the board of 
commissaries and the board of directors 
(Faccio, 2006). For example, PT Lapindo 
Brantas, Inc, a corporation owned by a 
general chairman of the Golongan Karya 
(Golkar) political party. It could easily 
obtain access to the government loan funds 
to provide compensation for Porong 
citizens, Sidoarjo, East Java, with the total 
amount of Rp 781 billion with a 4-year 
payback period (Kusumawati, 2015). Song, 
Nahm & Jung (2016), a corporation with 
political connection with the government 
could be the informal protective mechanism 
in the incomplete market competition. It 
usually applies to private corporations that 
typically have unreliable law and economic 
protections. The political connection can be 
the corporate added value that has a 
connection with the board of commissary 
and the board of directors.  
There are many studies about political 
connections. One of them is Do, Teik & 
Dang's (2012) study. They found the close 
relationship between a corporation and the 
government could increase the firm value 
by 1.36%. Other studies in Indonesia found 
that political connection with the 
government or politicians in the era of Joko 
Widodo had significant influences on non-
financial sector companies, listed in IDX 
(Pratama & Setiawan, 2019). Wulandari 
(2018) found the significant influence of 
political connection toward the 
performance of Indonesian mining sector 
companies in 2010-2014. 
The signal theory could explain the 
influence of political connection and firm 
value. The political connection of the board 
of commissary or the board of directors 
could provide various benefits. Thus, it is 
useful to improve the firm value (Purwanto, 
2011).  Faccio (2006) Argues that a 
corporation with political connections has 
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ease of access to loans, tenders, and lower 
tax rates from the government. Therefore, 
the political connection of a corporation 
provides positive signs for the external 
party. 
Patriarini (2020) found investors in 
Indonesia perceived corporations with 
political connections as something valuable. 
Any board of commissary or board of 
directors that also becomes government 
politicians has a greater role to determine 
the stakeholder protection through the 
applied policy and regulation by the 
government (Ang, Ding & Thong, 2017). 
The managers use the corporate assets to 
provide financial support for the politician's 
nomination. It has the purpose to provide 
protection for the corporate interest once 
the politician is elected. 
Goldman, Rochol & So, (2009; 2013) 
Investigated the gap between political 
connection and the firm value that had a 
political connection with the winning party 
during the United States’ election. Wang, 
Zhang, & Su, (2018) found corporations 
that had political connections with 
dismissed officials experienced lower equity 
values. Both previous studies have 
differences. However, the political 
connection tends to influence the firm 
value. Therefore, the first hypothesis 
formulation is:  
H1: The political connection positively 
influences the firm value 
Tax aggressiveness refers to a tax 
managerial activity to minimize the 
corporate tax. This activity becomes the 
public spotlight because it is not relevant to 
the stakeholders’ interests. Thus, the tax 
aggressiveness can influence the firm values 
for the investors (Devi & Supadmi, 2018). 
The tax aggressiveness does not only 
occur because of tax noncompliance of 
corporations but also the aggressive tax 
managerial activities by capitalizing the 
loopholes of tax regulation or any applied 
regulation, known as tax sheltering (Ridha & 
Martani, 2017).  Besides that, the manager 
may take this action to cover the manager's 
opportunistic action (Midiastuty, Suranta& 
Kristiba, 2017). 
The theory of agency could explain the 
influence or connection between tax 
aggressiveness toward firm value. The 
difference of interest between the principal 
and agent parties raises a gap. Ferdiawan & 
Firmansyah (2017) explain that a manager 
who manipulates the corporate profit to 
reduce the corporate tax has the purpose to 
obtain corporate compensation.  Thus, the 
corporation could achieve its target. 
However, the principal party disagrees with 
it because it may rise to legal issues and 
lower the firm values because of low 
corporate profits.  
Chen, Hu, Wang & Tang (2014) found 
that tax aggressiveness influenced 
information discrepancy in which a 
corporation presented. It had mismatch 
information between the information and 
the actual situation of the corporation. 
Thus, it could influence the investors' 
decisions to judge the corporations' future. 
If the public realizes the tax aggressiveness 
action, it will influence the stock price 
movement of the corporation and its firm 
value Devi & Supadmi, 2018).  
Hanlon & Slemrod, (2009) studied the 
gaps of tax aggressiveness found in firm 
values. They revealed that tax 
aggressiveness influenced the stock price 
negatively. They found it on corporations 
that were considered more aggressive while 
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evading the tax. Lestari (2014) found better 
corporate tax planning led to higher 
corporate profit. This matter improved the 
firm value. From the explanation, the 
second hypothesis is: 
H2: Tax aggressiveness negatively 
influenced firm value 
 
METHOD 
This research is descriptive quantitative 
research. It used data samples from the 
research population to be analyzed 
statistically. The descriptive elements of the 
research were the descriptions and notes 
about the political connection and tax 
aggressiveness as the independent variable 
(X) toward the firm value as the dependent 
variable (Y).  
This study took the mining sector listed 
in the IDX from 2016 until 2018. The 
reason for choosing the sector was mining 















Sources: Data processed, 2020 
 
it had a strong connection with the 
government regulation to obtain the mining 
permit. The study used the recent-three-year 
data of mining corporations from 2016 until 
2018. It was because the years were the 
political years of Indonesia due to the 
national election. The researchers used the 
purposive sampling method to take the samples 
of the corporation based on certain criteria 
as stated in Table 1. 
Based on the samples criteria, the 
researchers found 66 corporations that met 
the criteria and could be used as the research 
sample. 
 
The Dependent Variable 
 The firm value in this research was 
the dependent variable. The firm value 
refers to the corporate-selling price when 
the corporation will be sold (Sugeng, 2012). 
Tobin's Q formula in this research was for 



















Number Criteria Total 
1 Any mining sector corporations 
consecutively listed in IDX from 2016 
until 2018 
42 
2 The corporations published the annual 
reports consecutively during the period 
of 2016-2018. 
33 
3 Any mining corporations that gained 
profits from 2016 until 2018. 
22 
 The sample of the corporations 22 
 The total of the research sample 66 data 
Table 1. The Research Sampling Criteria 
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The researcher took the formula of firm 
value measurement from Devi & Supadmi, 
(2018) as shown below: 
 
Remarks: 
Tobins’Q = The Firm value 
EMV = Equity Market Value (Closing price 
times the outstanding share) 
EBV = Equity Book Value  
D = Debt 
 
Independent Variable 
The Political Connection 
Any corporations with political 
connections were observable from the 
arrangement of the board of commissary 
and the board directors or the shareholders. 
This research measured the political 
connection with a dummy variable. The 
researchers labeled corporations with 
political connection with 1 while those 
without political connection with 0. 
The political connection criteria were 
based on Wulandari (2013). The criteria are:   
1. The board of commissary and/or the 
board of directors have double 
positions as politicians and are affiliated 
with political parties. 
2. The board of commissary and/or the 
board of directors has double positions 
as the government officials. 
3. The board of commissary and/or the 
board of directors has double positions 
as military officials. 
4. The board of commissary and/or the 
board of directors has double positions 
as the retirements of government 
officials or the retirement of military 
officials.  
Tax Aggressiveness 
 It refers to tax evasion aggressively to 
reduce or remove the tax debt that should 
be paid by corporations. The ETR, Effective 
Tax Rate, is the most applied formula to 
calculate the tax aggressiveness level. The 
ratio of ETR is the appropriate ratio to 
calculate because it takes the current tax 
burden and the deferred tax. The 
researchers used Devi & Supadmi's (2018) 
study as the reference to measure tax 
aggressiveness as follow: 
 
Remarks: 
 ETR: The tax aggressiveness level 
 Total Tax Expenses: Total tax expenses 
 Pre Tax Income : Profit before tax 
 
Data Collection 
The data type of this research is 
secondary data from the annual financial 
reports of the mining corporations listed in 
IDX from 2016 until 2018. The researchers 
obtained the data from the IDX site 
www.idx.co.id.  
The Data Analysis Technique 
This research used a multiple linear 
regression model to analyze the data and to 
examine the influence of political 
connection and the tax aggressiveness level 
toward the firm value. Here is the model 
equation. 
Y = ɑ +ß1X1- ß2X2+ɛ 
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Remarks: 
Y        = The firm value 
ɑ         = Constant 
ß1- ß2 = The regression coefficient 
X1       = The political connection 
X2       = Tax aggressiveness 




 Table 2 shows the results of the descriptive 
statistics assisted by statistics software, SPSS 
20. The results obtain the minimum value of 
the firm value (TOBIN’S Q) for PT Ratu 
Prabu Energi Tbk in 2017 with 0.454  and 
maximum value for PT Bayan Resource Tbk 
in 2018 with 0.4386. The average firm value 
for all samples is 1.30608. It shows the 
overvalued average of the firm values in 











Source: The processed data, 2020 
 
tion is 0.732460. It means the firm values of 
the sample are homogeneous.  
The political connection is the first 
independent variable. The researchers used 
the dummy variable as the measuring tool. If 
the corporations had the board of 
commissary or the board of directors that 
were connected with politics, the 
researchers labeled them with 1. Then, if the 
corporations that had the board of 
commissary or the board of directors 
without political connections, the 
researchers labeled them with 0. Table 2 
shows that a percentage of 57.58% or 38 
corporations as the sample have the board 
of commissary and the board of directors 
with political connection. A percentage of 
42.42% or 28 corporations have the board 
of commissary and the board of directors 
without political connections. The findings 
showed some corporations had political 
connections in certain years. However, in 
















Remarks Tobin’s ETR Valid N 
 
N 66 66 66 
Min 0,084 0,454  
Max 1,134 4,386  
Mean 1,30608  0,35118  
Std. Deviation 0,171866 0,732460  
    
Variable Dummy    
Variable %Score1 %Score0 Total% 
KPOL 38/57,58% 28/42,42% 66/100% 
Table 2. The Results of Descriptive Statistics 
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not showing have any further connection 
and vice versa.  
The tax aggressiveness (ETR) is the 
second independent variable. Table 2 shows 
the minimum score of ETR is 0.084 for PT. 
Ratu Prabu Energi, Tbk in 2016. The 
maximum score of ETR is 1.134 for PT 
Surya Esa Perkasa, Tbk in 2018. The ETR 
average score of the sample is 0.35118. the 
descriptive data shows the mining 
corporations in Indonesia evade the tax. The 
evidence can be seen from value of ETR. 
Lower ETR value or near-to-zero value has 
a higher tax aggressiveness level (Luke & 
Zulaikha, 2016). Then, the standard of 
deviation shows 0.171866. It means the firm 
value data of the sample are homogeneous. 
The Multiple Linear Regression 
Analysis 
Table 3 is an analysis summary of the 
multiple linear regression analysis to find out 
the influence of political connection and tax 
aggressiveness toward the firm value in 
mining sector corporations listed in IDX 











Source: The processed data, 2020 
 
 
Table 3 shows total determination 
value of model (the adjusted R2  value) is 
0.055. It means the political connection and 
the tax aggressiveness only explain the 
dependent variable (firm value) with a 
percentage of 5.5%. The remaining 
percentage, 94.5%, is influenced by other 
factors outside of the research model.  
The results of the political connection 
influence toward the firm value show a 
significant score of 0.781 which is higher 
than the standard used (0.05). It meant 
political connection did no influence the 
firm value. The presence of political 
connection of a corporation via the board of 
commissary or the board of directors did 
not influence the investors’ decision to 
invest. On the other hand, the influence of 
tax aggressiveness toward the firm value is 
0.024. It meant tax aggressiveness negatively 
and significantly influenced the firm value. 
It proved again that the corporations which 
committed to tax aggressiveness made the 
investors not interested to invest. Thus, the 
firm value of the corporations that 













Model B t Sig. 
(Constanta) -0,129 -0,818 0,416 
KPOL -0,032 -0,279 0,781 
ETR -0,274 -2,319 0,024 
Adjusted R2 0,055   
Table 3. The Multiple Linear Regression Analysis 
 




The Influence of Political Connection on 
the Firm value 
The results showed that political 
connections could not predict the firm 
value. Thus, the presence of political 
connection of a corporation via the board of 
commissary and the board of directors did 
not influence the firm value. It proved that 
investors did not pay attention to the close 
relationship of the corporations with 
government officials. Thus, investors did 
not consider the political connection of a 
corporation.  Tarihoran (2016) found that 
investors commonly tended to invest in 
corporations with high or stable profits. 
They did not take into account any political 
connection of the corporation. 
The political connection via the board 
of commissary and the board of directors 
was not important for the mining sector 
investors to consider. It was because the 
mining-sector corporations had been well-
established in Indonesia. Thus, it would not 
influence the firm value. Besides that, the 
mining sector corporations do not have 
tight competition (Wulandari, 2018).  
The regional election year, also called 
the political year of 2018, in 171 regions, 
became the opening of the national election 
vibe in 2019. It was considered able to 
influence the stock movement of mining 
issuers, such as Adaro Energy's stock. It 
lowered to a level of 1,930 per share (CNN 
Indonesia, June 25, 2018). The 
phenomenon made the investors assumed 
corporations with political connections had 
lower performance in the year. Thus, the 
investors did not invest in those 
corporations (Krisdayanti, 2020). 
Besides that, political connections put 
the firm value at disadvantage. The 
government, on the other hand, did not 
provide any benefit to the corporations 
(Berkman & Galpoththage, 2016). 
This research result was not relevant to 
the signaling theory. The theory says political 
connection established by a corporation 
becomes a positive sign for investors (Su, 
Fu, Huang & Shen, 2014).  The privilege and 
the accessibility to obtain loans could raise 
the corporate debt. These corporations 
would not take the risk to pay the loans with 
the corporate profits that should be paid for 
the investors' dividends (Dewanti, 2019).  
This research result was in line with Dewanti 
(2019). The researcher found political 
connection did not have a positive sign for 
the investors. 
The Influence of Tax Aggressiveness on 
the Firm value 
Based on the data analysis result, in 
Table 3, the tax aggressiveness significantly 
and negatively influenced the firm values. It 
indicated that tax aggressiveness committed 
by the managerial parties, such as tax 
planning or tax evasion could lower the firm 
values. The investors assumed that this 
action had a higher risk than corporations 
without tax aggressiveness.  
Chen, Chen, Chen, & Shevlin (2010) 
found tax aggressiveness could lead to some 
disadvantages the action was indicated. The 
disadvantages of the action were such as 
sanction and penalty of tax authorities, both 
administrative sanction or fine. According 
to Law of the Republic of Indonesia, 
Number 9 the Year 2017, Article 7 Clause 
(3), that regulates the leaders and/or the 
entity employees that create a false 
statement, and hide or reduce the financial 
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account information that must be reported, 
will be sentenced to confinement at least 
one year or fined with the highest charge of 
Rp. 1.000.000.000 (one billion rupiahs).  
The current research result confirms 
the previous results that found tax 
aggressive action violated the tax rules. This 
matter would decrease the shareholders’ trust 
so the stock price lowered (Jiang, Lee, & 
Yue, 2010). Besides that, the tax 
aggressiveness could lower the firm values 
(Wahab, Shaipah, & Holland, 2012). 
Therefore, the investors tended to invest in 
corporations that did not commit tax 
aggressiveness. The tax aggressiveness 
committed by the managers, with profit 
management, made investors not interested 
in the corporations. Investors considered 
corporations that committed tax 
aggressiveness would not be able to share 
the dividend.  
This result is relevant to the agency 
theory. It says that agency matter occurs 
between the managers and the stakeholders 
due to asymmetric information (Devi & 
Supadmi, 2018). In this case, managers 
manipulated the corporate profit to reduce 
the deferred tax. However, the principal 
parties did not want this matter because it 
had legal issue potentials (Ferdiawan & 
Firmansyah, 2017). Thus, the reported 
profit before tax by the corporation would 
be lower so it reduced the deferred tax.  
 
CONCLUSION AND SUGGESTION  
 
This research focuses on the influence of 
political connection and tax aggressiveness 
toward the firm values in mining sector 
corporations of Indonesia, from 2016 until 
2018. Based on the results, the researchers 
concluded that political connections could 
not predict the firm values.  It was because 
the investors did not pay attention to the 
close relationship between the corporations 
and the government officials or politicians. 
Some investors assumed corporations with 
the political connection would have higher 
corporate loans because of the privileges 
they obtained, such as access to obtain 
loans. It made the corporate profit lowered 
because the corporation had to pay the loans 
instead of sharing the dividends for the 
investors.  
Secondly, tax aggressiveness negatively 
and significantly influenced the firm values 
because investors assumed the corporations 
committed higher tax aggressiveness. This 
action could also put the corporations at 
disadvantage due to sanctions or 
confinement of the tax authorities. Thus, it 
could decrease the shareholders' trust. 
Eventually, it would lower the stock price 
that indicated the firm values. 
The limitations of the research were 
the observed aspect of political connection. 
It was only from the biography of the board 
of directors and commissary stated in the 
annual financial report. Thus, any 
corporations with indirect political 
connections, such as family or friendship 
relationships, could not be observed. 
Further studies should find the political 
connection via indirect relationships. The 
next researchers could also change the 
variable with the data of the share 
ownership from the government so the data 




This paper is based upon work supported  
 
10 |Ekonomi Bisnis, Volume 26, Nomor 1 | Maret 2021 | Halaman 1-12 
 
by Competitiveness Research Grant (Hibah 
Bersaing Penelitian) of Universitas Negeri 
Malang (UM). Therefore, the author would 
say many thanks to all parties who support 
this project realization. Any findings, 
comments, conclusions and or 
recommendations in this paper are 
personally from the author and do not 
reflect the views of Universitas Negeri 





Ang, J. S., Ding, D. K., & Thong, T. Y. 
(2013). Political connection and firm 
value. Asian Development Review, 
30(2), 131–166. 
Berkman, H. & Galpoththge, V. 2016. 
Political Connection and Firm Value: 
an analysis of the listed firm in Sri 
Lanka. Emeraldinsight. Pacific Accounting 
Review, Vol. 28 Issue 1, pp. 92-106 
Chen, X., Hu, N., Wang, X., & Tang, X. 
2014. Tax Avoidance and Firm Value: 
Evidence from China. Nankai Business 
Review International. 5(1) 25-42. 
Chen, S., Chen, X., Chen, Q & Shevlin, T., 
2010. Are Family Firms More Tax 
Aggressive Than Non- Family Firms?. 
Journal of Financial Economics, 95(1), pp. 
41-61. 
CNN Indonesia. 2018. Harga Batu Bara 





Devi, P. N. C., & Supadmi, N. L. 2018. 
Pengaruh Agresivitas Pajak Pada Nilai 
Perusahaan Dengan Ukuran 
Perusahaan Sebagai Pemoderasi. E-
Jurnal Akuntansi, 22, 2257.  
Dewanti, M. R. 2019. Pengaruh Koneksi 
Politik Terhadap Nilai Perusahaan 
yang Terdaftar di BEI. Artikel Ilmiah: 
Sekolah Tinggi Ilmu Ekonomi 
Perbanas Surabaya. 
Do, Q. A., and Teik L. Y., & Dang, N., B. 
2012 Political Connections and Firm 
Value: Evidence from Close 
Gubernatorial Elections (March 2015).  
Faccio, M. 2006. Politically connected firms. 
American Economic Review, 96(1), 369–
386.  
Ferdiawan, Y, & Firmansyah, A. 2017. 
Pengaruh Political Connection, 
Foreign Activity, dan, Real Earnings 
Management Terhadap Tax 
Avoidance. Jurnal Riset Akuntansi Dan 
Keuangan, 5 (3), 1601-1624. 
Genjar & Oktavia, I. (2015). Faktor-Faktor 
Yang Mempengaruhi Harga Saham. 
Seminar Nasional Manajemen Dan 
Bisnis Ke-3 Program Studi Manajemen 
Fakultas Ekonomi Dan Bisnis 
Universitas Jember, 28-43. 
Goldman, E., Rocholl, J., dan So, J. 2009. 
Do Politically Connected Boards 
Affect Firm Value?. The Review of 
Financial Studies, 22 (6), 2331-2360 
Goldman, E., Rocholl, J., & So, J. 2013. 
Politically connected boards of 
directors and the allocation of 
procurement contracts. Review of 
Finance, 17(5), 1617–1648 
Hanlon, M., & Slemrod, J.B. 2009. What 
Does Tax Aggressiveness Signal? 
Evidence from Stock Price Reactions 
to News About Tax Shelter 
Involvement. Journal of Public Economics, 
93 (1-2), pp: 126-141 
Hariati, I & Yeney W., R. 2015. Pengaruh 
Tata Kelola Perusahaan dan Kinerja 
Sulastri & Sari, The Political Connection and Tax Aggressiveness Impact to Firm Value| 2 
 
Lingkungan Terhadap Nilai 
Perusahaan. Simposium Nasional 
Akuntansi XVIII, Medan, 16-19 
September 2015 
Jiang, G., Lee, C.M.C. and Yue, H. 2010, 
Tunneling through intercorporate 
loans: the China experience, Journal of 
Financial Economics, Vol. 98 No. 1, pp. 
1-20. 
Krisdiyanti. 2020. Pengaruh Corporate 
Governance dan Koneksi Politik 
Terhadap Nilai Perusahaan Pada 
Perusahaan Non Keuangan yang 
Terdaftar di Bursa Efek Indonesia. 
Artikel Ilmiah: Universitas Mercu Buana 
Yogyakarta. 
Kusumawati, U., D. 2015. Utang Lapindo 






Luke, L dan Z. Zulaikha. 2016. Analisis 
Faktor Yang Mempengaruhi 
Agresivitas Pajak (Studi Empiris Pada 
Perusahaan Manufaktur Yang 
Terdaftar di Bursa Efek Indonesia 
Pada Tahun 2012-2014). Jurnal 
Akuntansi Dan Auditing, vol. 13, no. 1, 
pp. 80-96, 
Lestari, N. 2014. Pengaruh Tax Planning 
terhadap Nilai Perusahaan. 
Akuntabilitas 7 (1), pp: 69-83 
Midiastuty, P., Suranta, E., & Kristiba. 2017. 
Pengaruh Penghindaran Pajak 
terhadap Struktur Modal Perusahaan. 
Simposium Nasional Akuntansi XX 
Jember. 
Rahayu, M., & Sari, B. (2018). Faktor-Faktor 
Yang Mempengaruhi Nilai Perusahaan. 
Ikraith-Humaniora, 2(2), 1–8.  
Patriarini, W., E. 2020. Pengaruh Koneksi 
Politik terhadap Nilai Perusahaan. E- 
Jurnal Akuntansi. Vol 30 (6). 1150-1560. 
Pratama, V., Y., & Setiawan, D. 2019. 
Political Connection and Firm Value in 
Indonesia. Sebelas Maret Business Review, 
3(1), 1-7. 
Purwanto, A. 2011. Pengaruh Tipe Industri, 
Ukuran Perusahaan, Profitabilitas, 
terhadap Corporate Social 
Responsibility. Jurnal Akuntansi & 
Auditing, 8(1), 1- 94. 
Ridha, M., & Martani, D. 2014. Analisis 
terhadap Agresivitas Pajak, Agresivitas 
Pelaporan Keuangan, Kepemilikan 
Keluarga, dan Tata Kelola Perusahaan 
di Indoensia. Simposium Nasional 
Akuntnasi XVII, Nusa Tenggara Barat, 
24-27 
Song, Z, Nahm, A. & Yang, J. 2016. 
Institutional Environment, Political 
Connection of Partial State Ownership, 
and Performance. International Journal of 
Social Economics Vol. 43 No. 8, 2016 pp. 
856-870  
Su, Z. Q., Fung, H. G., Huang, D. S., & 
Shen, C.H. 2014. Cash dividends, 
expropriation, and political 
connections: Evidence from China. 
International Review of Economics & 
Finance, Volume 29, 260-271 
Sugeng, B. 2012. Manajemen Keuangan 
Fundamental. Yogyakarta: Deepublish 
Tarihoran, A. 2012. Pengaruh Penghindaran 
Pajak dan Leverage Terhadap Nilai 
Perusahaan Dengan Transparansi 
Perusahaan Sebagai Variabel Moderasi. 
Jurnal Wira Ekonomi Mikroskil. Vol 6, 
No. 2. 
Undang-Undang Republik Indonesia 
Nomor 9 Tahun 2017 Tentang Akses 
Informasi Keuangan Untuk 
Kepentingan Perpajakan. 2017. Jakarta. 
12 |Ekonomi Bisnis, Volume 26, Nomor 1 | Maret 2021 | Halaman 1-12 
 
Wahab, A, Shaipah, N & Holland, K. 2012. 
Tax planning, corporate governance, 
and firm value. British Accounting Review, 
44 (2), 111-124 
Wang, Xu, Zhang, dan Shu. 2018. Political 
connections, internal control, and firm 
value: Evidence from China's anti-
corruption campaign. Journal of Business 
Research. Vol 86. pp: 53-67 
Wulandari, L. 2018. Pengaruh Political 
Connection pada Dewan Komisaris 
dan Dewan Direksi Terhadap Kinerja 
Perusahaan Sektor Pertambangan 
Yang Terdaftar Di Bursa Efek 
Indonesia (BEI) Periode Tahun 2010-
2014. Jurnal Ilmiah Universitas Surabaya 
Vol.7 No.1 tahun 2018.  
Wulandari, T. 2013. Analisis Pengaruh 
Political Connection Dan Struktur 
Kepemilikan Terhadap Kinerja 
Perusahaan. Analisis Pengaruh Political 
Connection Dan Struktur Kepemilikan 
Terhadap Kinerja Perusahaan, 2, 141–
152. 
 
